Israel and Türkiye: an Emerging Rivalry

Finn Heß - Intern, St James Foreign Policy Group

When Israel’s cabinet voted in June 2026 to formally recognise the massacres committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians as a genocide, the public’s attention was briefly drawn to the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Israel and Türkiye. On July 2nd, The Economist – as the only Western news outlet to do so – even described it as the “next great Middle East rivalry”. While the development was quickly forgotten and has moved into a dangerous blind spot since, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide is only a symptom of emerging tensions between the two states amid a broader geopolitical race for regional influence.

Societal antagonisation: carefully crafted political framing of an enemy

The rhetoric has become distinctly sharper between the two countries in recent months, especially when looking at statements by both country’s governments. But the underlying societal developments have already been underway for multiple years, dating back to the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when Israel attacked a vessel of the Ship to Gaza flotilla, leading to the death of nine Turkish citizens. Since then, both governments have gradually normalised the antagonisation of the other side in the eyes of their respective populations.

Netanyahu is increasingly trying to portray Türkiye as a threat to national security. Despite Israel’s focus remaining on the ongoing conflict with Iran, Netanyahu has recently branded Türkiye as the “New Iran” demonstrating a perspective as an emerging threat. As evidenced by Erdoğan’s recent appearance on a Likud election poster alongside other “enemies” of Israel with the slogan “They want Netanyahu to lose… don’t let them win” there is now an accumulation of efforts to prime the Israeli “herd mentality” and to unify the population behind a supposed Turkish threat. 

In Türkiye, following AKP’s ascent to power, political Islam gained prominence in rhetoric, being used as a means to rally population behind certain policies through religious identification shared with the government. The events of October 7th, 2023 and the subsequent reduction of almost all trade between Türkiye and Israel in 2024, was used to strengthen the “rally-around-the-flag” strategy Erdoğan had adopted vis-à-vis Israel. A prominent example of this intertwined social and political targeting is the annual New Years protest for Gaza in Istanbul, which was organised by Bilal Erdoğan, the youngest son of the President, in 2026.

Competition for regional hegemony

This rivalry, though, is not unidimensional. The shift in mutual perceptions of the two societies is accompanied by a real geopolitical standoff with Syria as a focal point.  

Since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in 2024, both Israel and Türkiye have been trying to extend their influence in the region. Türkiye stands as one of the biggest supporters of Ahmed Al-Sharaa while also controlling significant parts of northern Syria with several thousand troops and military infrastructure on Syrian soil. Through this strategy, Türkiye aims to build a broader band of close allies serving as a buffer between Türkiye and Israel while asserting itself as a regional power.

Israel’s interest in Syria is two-fold. The rise of a Sunni president in Syria and subsequent destruction of Hezbollah supply lines certainly served Israel’s interests. Still, Israel remains hesitant about the Islamist government and wants to prevent an economic and political consolidation of Syria. A militarily weak Syrian state also gives Israel wide strategic depth, especially for its Air Force, as a buffer to Türkiye and corridor to Iran. With rival interests, escalation was only a matter of time as it finally came to a head Wednesday, August 19th with Israel’s attack on Abu al-Duhur airbase in Norther Syria – some 70km away from the Turkish border. Türkiye has since announced a full cut of diplomatic relations in response to the violation of Syria’s sovereignty.

However, Syria isn’t the only point of friction between the two countries. Both countries have made efforts to build opposing alliance systems in the Mediterranean. Türkiye recently signed a common defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, also known as the Mecca Agreement. Israel on their side had proposed in February a “hexagon of alliances” with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, India and other unnamed states to counter an “emerging radical Sunni axis” in a direct rebuttal of Türkiye.

Furthermore, the Somali Civil War sees Türkiye and Israel opposing each other once again, supporting Somalia and Somaliland respectively, opening the way for a proxy confrontation between the two countries. Azerbaijan, as a Turkic country a traditional ally of Türkiye, might become another field of competition. Despite a mutual defence agreement with Türkiye signed in 2021, Baku is the main supplier of energy to Israel and in return gets supplied with advanced military systems which has put the Azerbaijani government in a balancing act between both countries.

A conflict requiring risk-adjusted preparations

As of now, a direct confrontation between the two countries remains unlikely. Türkiye is a NATO member and both Israel and Türkiye have relatively good ties to the Trump administration, so it is difficult to imagine that NATO and Trump will allow a war to break out. At the same time, the off-ramps for de-escalation are scarce: their presence in Syria and the newly built alliances are vital interests for both countries, thus making compromise unlikely. On top of that, Netanyahu faces an election in September with many ultranationalists, especially Otzma Yehudit under the party leader and minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, in his alliance demanding broader escalation, not just in Syria, instead of appeasement.

A proxy stand-off between Israel and Türkiye on the other hand becomes increasingly possible. This might play out with competition in Syria, through support for different sides in the Somali civil war or a race for disputed gas reserves around Cyprus.

Any of those could become an ordeal if the West does not prepare for all possibilities. NATO – whose cohesion is already weakened by recent US foreign policy – might find itself with a member state that is in an active proxy conflict. At the same time the US, which intended to lower its involvement in the Middle East, could be drawn in even deeper, possibly having to decide which country to support politically and militarily.  

Lastly, rising tensions represent yet another strain on the global maritime industry that is already under immense pressure. At present, the Straight of Hormuz sees an active blockade and the Houthi have started attacks on Saudi ships in the Red Sea. Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean could further complicate shipping routes from Asia to Europe and could foreseeably expand into a broad regional conflict drawing in regional players such as Greece and Egypt.

The emerging rivalry between Israel and Türkiye demands great attention, particularly at a time where Iran retains much analytical focus.