Burnham’s First Moves: How the New Government Impacts Defence and Foreign Policy
Just over a week into Andy Burnham’s premiership, the outlines of his new government are already taking shape, with early signs of what it could mean both for the British public and for the country’s international partners. Although his first announcements have focused on living costs and regional inequality, the composition of his Cabinet suggests that foreign and defence policy will also be central to the new administration.
The appointments of John Healey as Chancellor, Ed Miliband as Foreign Secretary and Wes Streeting as Defence Secretary place experienced politicians in key departments. They also invite a more sceptical interpretation. Miliband and Streeting possess independent political authority, while Healey caused difficulties for Sir Keir Starmer by resigning over defence funding. The new Prime Minister may be seeking unity by bringing influential figures into government, but he has also placed them in charge of some of its most politically demanding challenges.
Burnham’s own vision remains domestic and localist. His first week measures, from restoring a £2 bus fare cap outside London and cutting VAT on electricity bills to providing 20% business rates relief and funding efforts to tackle rough sleeping, were intended to signal a visible change of direction to previous cabinets. Although designed primarily to offer immediate “breathing space” and demonstrate that government can deliver for communities, they also reflect Burnham’s wider emphasis on devolution, public-service reform and reindustrialisation.
The new Prime Minister’s ambition to rebuild Britain’s productive economy aligns closely with the country’s defence requirement for a larger skilled workforce and stronger regional industrial capacity. Equally, Burnham’s recent unveiling of No. 10 North, a dedicated Downing Street base in Manchester intended to bring central government closer to communities outside London, could help channel national investment towards manufacturing and regional growth.
Healey’s appointment is perhaps the most consequential. He resigned as Defence Secretary because Starmer’s investment plan would have raised defence spending to only 2.68 per cent of GDP by 2030, rather than the 3 per cent Healey believed necessary. Now he controls the purse strings to the Treasury decisions that will determine whether Britain can meet its military ambitions.
Healy’s move from defence to No. 11 therefore places military investment close to economic policy. He understands Britain’s personnel, stockpiles, procurement system and industrial base. He will also be acutely aware that Britain cannot credibly promise support for Ukraine, leadership in European security and fulfilment of its NATO commitments without greater investment in equipment, ammunition and manufacturing. But such a position also carries significant risks for Healy, who must now confront the fiscal constraints he previously criticised, reconciling higher defence spending with Burnham’s plans for social reform and regional renewal.
Streeting’s appointment as Defence Secretary is similarly unexpected. While he lacks military experience, Burnham may value the energy, communication skills and reforming instincts he displayed as the former Health Secretary. During Streeting’s tenure, England’s NHS waiting list fell by 515,000 to 7.11 million, its lowest level in three and a half years, although the improvement proved fragile and major problems remained. That record points to a departmental operator rather than a defence traditionalist. Streeting arrives in this new role without a strong attachment to the institutional culture or long-standing assumptions of defence, potentially giving him greater freedom to challenge established priorities.
One of Streeting's key opportunities could be to link defence reform to Burnham's wider vision of industrial policy. Investment in shipbuilding, aerospace, cyber capabilities, munitions and autonomous systems could strengthen the Armed Forces while creating skilled regional employment. Working alongside Healey, Streeting could form part of an effective partnership, with one focused on reshaping the department and the other controlling the resources.
Miliband’s appointment raises broader foreign policy questions. While his predecessor, Yvette Cooper, largely represented continuity through support for Ukraine, closer European cooperation and preservation of the transatlantic alliance, Miliband is a more ideological and independent figure.
With Burnham focused on domestic renewal, Miliband may enjoy unusual freedom to shape Britain’s international agenda. His decision to take Britain’s seat on the World Bank board, a role normally left to a junior minister, signals that climate change and development will sit closer to the heart of foreign policy. It suggests greater reliance on multilateral institutions, climate finance and engagement across Africa, Asia and the wider Global South.
Such an approach could broaden British diplomacy beyond Euro-Atlantic security and offer influence at a time when hard-power resources remain limited. However, it also faces significant practical constraints. The foreign aid budget is limited, Burnham’s domestic priorities are expensive, and Donald Trump’s administration remains hostile to much of the international climate agenda. Miliband must therefore balance his personal ambitions with Ukraine, European defence and Washington.
Early polling gives Burnham some political space, with the strongest first favourability rating for a new prime minister since Theresa May in 2016. His government also begins with a positive vision of defence as part of national revitalisation—rebuilding military production, technical skills and regional industry could strengthen Britain at home while giving substance to its commitments abroad. Healey’s move to the Treasury potentially aligns Britain’s defence ambitions with the financial authority required to deliver them, while Streeting may bring the confidence needed to reform how those resources are used.
Equally, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s position as Burnham’s first international visitor since entering No. 10 underlines the stability of Britain’s commitment to Ukraine. The visit also highlights practical cooperation, including Black Sea naval training and the transfer of British electronic-jamming technology which will be used to interfere with Russian air-defence systems and strengthen Ukraine’s operational capabilities.
Beyond this, the wider direction of foreign policy is less settled. Miliband could extend British influence through climate diplomacy, development finance and engagement beyond Europe, but must ensure that these initiatives remain aligned with the government’s core security priorities.
There is no doubt that Burnham’s first week in office has demonstrated energy and political intent. The long-term success of his government, however, will ultimately depend on whether that intent can be converted into sustained investment, difficult strategic choices and a coherent national strategy to protect Britain’s interests in an increasingly unstable world.
By Jay Fleischmann - Intern, St James’s Foreign Policy Group